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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Edward Stevens appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Stevens killed Casey Whiteside, his girlfriend's eleven-month-old child. 
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 142, 191 P.3d 217, 220 (2008). A jury found 
him guilty of first-degree murder after a trial. kt. "At that trial, both the State and 
the defense presented expert witnesses to support their theories of the case"; the 
state that Stevens had battered Casey to death and Stevens that Casey had 
fallen down stairs. kt. Stevens moved for a new trial, claiming evidence that 
Casey has been prescribed an acid reflux medicine called Propulsid and that 
Casey's eyes had been removed after embalming instead of before was newly 
discovered evidence that would produce a different verdict. kt. at 144, 191 P.3d 
at 222. The district court denied the motion for a new trial. kt. The Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment and order denying a new 
trial. kt. at 143-48, 191 P.3d at 221-26. 
Stevens filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 8-24.) His 
claims included ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to discover, prior to 
trial, evidence that Casey's eyes had been removed after embalming and that he 
had been taking Propulsid (R., pp. 10-14); that the prosecution had suppressed 
evidence that Casey's eyes had been removed after embalming (R., pp. 21-22); 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as an issue the denial of 
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a motion to disqualify Justice Eismann from continuing to preside over the motion 
for a new trial after his elevation from the district court bench (R., pp. 22-23); and 
that trial counsel had failed to present additional expert testimony in support of 
the defense theories (R., pp. 12-13). The state answered the petition. (R., pp. 
271-320.) 
The parties cross-moved for summary disposition. (R., pp. 348-49, 396-
400; see also R., pp. 351-94, 401-33, 435-56, 458-64, 466-90, 506-22, 524-26, 
527-28, 1678-93, 1695-97.) The district court granted partial summary dismissal. 
(R., pp. 1757-83, 1805-06, 1817-27.) After an evidentiary hearing the district 
court denied the remaining claims. (R., pp. 2355-2383.) Relevant to this appeal, 
the district court found that the state had not withheld exculpatory evidence 
regarding when Casey's eyes were taken for testing (R., pp. 2364-70); that trial 
counsel was not deficient for failing to discover the embalming report prepared by 
the mortuary (upon which the claim that Casey's eyes were taken post-
embalming rested) (R., pp. 2370-71); that trial counsel's investigation into 
whether the medicine Propulsid, which Casey was taking, might provide a 
defense was adequate (R., pp. 2372-75); and there was no ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failing to present additional experts in support of the defense 
theories (R., pp. 2375-79). Stevens filed an appeal, timely from the district 
court's order. (R., pp. 2384-90.) 
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ISSUES 
Due to its length, Stevens' statement of the issues is not reproduced here. 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Stevens failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim 
that appellate counsel was ineffective for electing not to challenge Justice 
Eismann's appointment to continue as the district judge in the criminal 
case? 
2. Has Stevens failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that he 
failed to prove in the evidentiary hearing either a due process or an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to the removal of the 
victim's eyes for testing? 
3. Has Stevens failed to show clear error in the district court's finding that 
trial counsel had conducted an adequate investigation into the potential 
viability of a defense based on the victim having taken the acid reflex 
medication Propulsid? 
4. Has Stevens failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to present additional expert 
testimony in support of the defense theories of the case? 
5. Has Stevens failed to show that there was "cumulative" prejudice from any 
alleged deficient performance by counsel because he failed to show two 




Stevens Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim That 
Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective For Electing Not To Challenge Justice 
Eismann's Appointment To Continue As The District Judge In The Criminal Case 
A. Introduction 
The Idaho Supreme Court issued an order assigning Justice Eismann 
(who had presided over the trial as a district judge prior to his elevation to the 
Idaho Supreme Court) to Stevens' criminal case "for purposes of a pending 
Motion for New Trial." (R., p. 1086.) Stevens' trial counsel filed a Petition 
requesting the Idaho Supreme Court to reconsider the appointment. (R., pp. 
1153-55.) Stevens' trial counsel also filed a "Notice of Objection to Assignment 
of Judge" and a motion to disqualify in the district court. (R., pp. 1104-06, 1108-
10.) Justice Eismann denied the motion on the basis that the Idaho Supreme 
Court, on a four-to-zero vote, denied Stevens' petition for reconsideration of the 
order appointing Justice Eismann. (R., p. 1182.) 
Stevens asserted in post-conviction that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise the denial of his motion to disqualify as an issue on 
appeal. (R., pp. 22-23.) The district court summarily dismissed this claim. (R., 
p. 1780.) On reconsideration the district court stated that, because the Idaho 
Supreme Court had reviewed and rejected Stevens' claim in his petition 
challenging the appointment, appellate counsel was "not ineffective for failing to 
raise on direct appeal that which was already decided." (R., pp. 1805-06.) 
Presenting substantially the same arguments addressed in the denial of Stevens' 
request for reconsideration (compare R., pp. 1153-55 with Appellant's brief, pp. 
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27-34), Stevens claims that he presented a triable issue of whether appellate 
counsel was ineffective. His argument fails, however, because he has not even 
articulated, much less applied, the relevant legal standards. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426,434,835 P.2d 661,669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. kL. at 434, 835 P.2d 
at 669. However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001). 
C. Stevens Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That 
Appellate Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Raise An Issue 
Barred By Law Of The Case 
The two-prong Strickland1 test for ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
also applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Baxter v. 
State, 149 Idaho 859, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Mintun v. State, 144 
Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007». In order to establish 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner has the burden of proving 
that his counsel's representation on appeal was deficient and that the deficiency 
1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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was prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 
Idaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). Appellate counsel has no 
constitutional obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by the 
defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758,765,760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-754). 
Because the decision to raise certain issues on appeal is tactical, to show 
deficient performance the claimant must show that decision was "based on 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable 
of objective evaluation." Baxter, 149 Idaho at 863, 243 P.3d at 679. The 
relevant inquiry under the prejudice prong is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would have prevailed on 
appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Schoger v. State, 148 
Idaho 622, 629, 226 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2010) (citing State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548,561,199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008)). 
The district court concluded there was no ineffective assistance of counsel 
"in failing to raise on direct appeal that which was already decided" by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. (R., p. 1806.) Because the Idaho Supreme Court had denied 
Stevens' petition for reconsideration of the appointment of Justice Eismann to 
hear the motion for new trial, the propriety of the appointment had become law of 
the case and was not a viable issue on appeal. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 
709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (decisions of Idaho Supreme Court become 
law of the case); Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 816, 
153 P.3d 1158, 1162 (2007); Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752,759,40 P.3d 110, 
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117 (2002); Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001); 
Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000). Neither 
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is met because the decision 
to not present a barred claim was not objectively deficient and because the 
procedural bar meant Stevens would not have prevailed. 
Stevens argues the district court was "not correct because the Court could 
not have ruled on the merits of the claim not properly before it" because the 
Idaho Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on his petition requesting 
reconsideration of the order appointing Justice Eismann. (Appellant's brief, p. 
31.) Thus, apparently, the argument Stevens believes his appellate counsel 
should have presented was that Justice Eismann, acting as a district court judge 
appointed for the limited purpose of hearing the motion for a new trial, erred by 
not concluding that the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of Stevens' petition, which 
affirmed Justice Eismann's appointment, was rendered without jurisdiction, and 
then further erred by not concluding the Idaho Supreme Court erred in its initial 
appointment. (Appellant's brief, pp. 31-34.) Stevens, however, neither claimed 
nor presented evidence that the failure to make this argument in the criminal 
appeal was the result of any ignorance of the law or other objective shortcoming. 
In addition, he has failed to show any likelihood that his argument that the 
Idaho Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to appoint Justice Eismann to preside 
over the case would have prevailed. Idaho Const., Art. V, § 2 creates a unitary 
court system that "centralize[s] the administrative power of the entire judicial 
system in the Supreme Court" and grants the Supreme Court supervisory power 
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over "all judicial personnel." Crooks v. Maynard, 112 Idaho 312, 315-16, 732 
P.2d 281,284-85 (1987). See also I.C. § 1-613 ("Whenever the administrative 
director's report indicates that there is need for judicial assistance in any court, 
the Supreme Court shall assign to that court any judge .... " (emphasis added»; 
McGill v. Lester, 105 Idaho 692, 693, 672 P.2d 570, 571 (Ct. App. 1983) (no 
constitutional issue raised by challenge to appointment of judge). 
Stevens' claim that the Idaho Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the 
appointment of Justice Eismann and thus its pre-appeal ruling that the 
appointment was proper was also without jurisdiction and therefore appellate 
counsel was objectively deficient in failing to raise the issue is simply 
unsupportable. He has therefore also failed to show prejudice. 
II. 
Stevens Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That 
Stevens Failed To Prove At The Evidentiary Hearing His Due Process Or 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims Related To The Removal Of The 
Victim's Eyes For Testing 
A. Introduction 
After trial, the parties discovered a mortuary embalming report that listed 
Casey's eye color, suggesting that Casey's eyes had not been removed for 
testing prior to embalming. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 145-46, 191 P.3d 
217, 223-24 (2008). Stevens moved for a new trial claiming that the embalming 
report called into question the accuracy of the state's experts who testified 
evidence from the eyes indicated Casey was shaken to death. !9..:. The district 
court rejected the motion for a new trial, holding that the evidence was not newly 
discovered because it could have been obtained prior to trial with the exercise of 
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due diligence. kL. at 146, 191 P.3d at 224. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
the ruling of the trial court. kL. 
In the post-conviction evidentiary hearing Stevens claimed "he was denied 
his right to due process because the State committed a Brady violation when it 
allegedly failed to turn over evidence showing Casey's eyes had been removed 
post-embalming." (R., p. 2364.) The district court found "Stevens has failed to 
show the prosecutor had actual knowledge that Casey's eyes were allegedly 
removed post-embalming." (R., pp. 2364-65.) The district court rejected the 
argument that others associated with the prosecution knew the removal of the 
eyes occurred post-embalming based on the finding that Casey's eyes were not, 
in fact, removed after embalming. (R., pp. 2365-70.) 
Stevens asserts that the court's finding that the eyes were removed before 
embalming is erroneous. (Appellant's brief, pp. 34-46, 48-49.) He further claims 
that the fact that the eyes were collected after embalming "was known to a 
member of the law enforcement team," and identifies the prosecutor, the coroner, 
the coroner's assistant, the pathologist, and three police officers as persons who 
were allegedly aware that the eyes were taken after embalming. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 37, 52-53.) Stevens has failed to show clear error in the district court's 
factual findings, which specifically rejected Stevens' arguments and interpretation 
of the evidence. (Compare R., pp. 2364-70 with Appellant's brief, pp. 49-53.) 
Stevens also claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to learn of the 
embalming report prior to trial. (R., p. 2370.) The trial court concluded counsel's 
performance was not deficient because prior to the second trial there was no 
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"reason to believe the embalming report might contain relevant evidence." (R., 
pp. 2370-71.) Stevens asserts that the finding that the report could have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence, made in response to the new 
trial motion, establishes counsel's deficient performance as res judicata. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 62-66.) Stevens' argument fails because the legal 
standards applicable to the availability of evidence through due diligence and 
whether counsel's investigation of potential evidence was deficient are not 
synonymous, and therefore not controlled by principles of res judicata. Stevens 
has therefore failed to show error by the trial court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based. 
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92 
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). When the district court 
conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly 
erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court 
from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-
730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters 
solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 
97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's decision that a post-
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conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. 
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P .2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
C. Stevens Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's Factual 
Finding That No Evidence That Casey's Eyes Were Taken Post-
Embalming Was In The Possession Of The Prosecution Team 
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense all 
exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963). To prove a Brady violation, a defendant must show: (1) that 
the evidence was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was 
suppressed by the government; and (3) the suppressed evidence was material to 
his guilt or punishment. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). 
The duty to disclose applies to evidence possessed by or known to the 
prosecutor or "others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the 
police." Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). Thus, to prevail, "a claimant 
must show that the favorable evidence was possessed by a district's prosecution 
team, which includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel." Moon v. 
Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11 th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted); see 
also McLaughlin V. Corsini, 577 F.3d 15, 20 (1 st Cir. 2009) (Brady extends to 
exculpatory material "possessed by the prosecution team or its agents"); 
Stephens V. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("The Brady rule applies 
to evidence possessed by the prosecution team, which includes both the 
investigators and prosecutors."). The duty does not extend, for example, to 
evidence held by non-police state witnesses, United States V. Graham, 484 F.3d 
413, 417 (6th Cir. 2007), private companies hired by the government to process 
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paperwork, United States v. Gray, 648 F.3d 562 (ih Cir. 2011) (records of private 
company hired to process Medicaid claims not within possession of prosecution 
team), or "other government agencies that have no involvement in the 
investigation or prosecution at issue," United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197,216 
(3rd Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). 
The evidence and the factual findings of the district court demonstrate that 
the prosecution team possessed no evidence indicating that Casey's eyes had 
been taken after his body was embalmed.2 The district court concluded that 
although Stevens had raised "doubts" about whether the eyes were removed 
during the autopsy, the evidence ultimately showed they had been. (R., pp. 
2368-69.) The "most compelling" evidence supporting Stevens' post-embalming 
removal theory was the mortician's notation on the embalming report that 
Casey's eyes were brown, suggesting the eyes were still in the body at the time 
of embalming. (R., p. 2368.) Contrary to this evidence, however, was that Dr. 
Slaughter, the pathologist who conducted the autopsy, was the "only person" 
who could have removed the eyes; that Dr. Slaughter was aware before the 
autopsy that he should remove the eyes in this instance; and that no agent of the 
state had access to Casey's body after it was delivered to the funeral home 
where the embalming took place except a 15 to 20 minute window when a long 
2 Stevens has never claimed that the mortician's report, prepared by a mortician 
in a private funeral home hired by Casey's family, was ever in the possession of 
the prosecution team prior to the second trial or that the state ever withheld that 
report. Stevens' claim is apparently based on the assertion that members of the 
prosecution team had personal knowledge that the eyes were taken after 
embalming and failed to disclose this personal knowledge to the defense. 
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bone x-ray was conducted, which time frame was probably not long enough to 
perform the procedure of removing the eyes. (R., pp. 2368-69.3) Because 
Casey's eyes had in fact been removed before embalming, and all the evidence 
that they had been removed post-embalming was in the hands of private persons 
unaffiliated with the prosecution, the prosecution team never possessed nor 
withheld evidence that the removal had been post-embalming. 
All of these factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Dr. 
Slaughter testified that he removed the eyes from Casey's body. (Exhibits, pp. 
1573 (P.H. Tr., p. 96, Ls. 9-17),4225-26 (08/24/04 Tr., p. 39, L. 17 - p. 40, L. 
16).) He did not, when asked nearly eight years later, remember exactly when 
he did so, but believed it was during the autopsy. (Exhibits, pp. 4226-27 
(08/24/04 Tr., p. 40, L. 3 - p. 41, L. 9), 4230 (08/24/04 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 13-15), 
4231-33 (08/24/04 Tr., p. 45, L. 4 - p. 47, L. 18),4230-31 (08/24/04 Tr., p. 44, L. 
16 - p. 45, L. 3),4235 (08/24/04 Tr., p. 49, Ls. 3-25),4237 (08/24/04 Tr., p. 51, 
Ls. 11-23).) He did so upon the advice of more experienced pathologists. 
(Exhibits, pp. 1566 (P.H. Tr., p. 66, Ls. 2-23), 4226-27 (08/24/04 Tr., p. 40, L. 17 
- p. 41, L. 7).) Dr. Slaughter testified eight years after the autopsy: "I have no 
specific memory of the exact time that I took the eyes. I'm assuming I took them 
at the time of autopsy because it would be unusual for me to do it any other time. 
3 The district court noted that Mr. Reinke, the mortician, testified that the 
procedure for removing eyes could be done in 10 to 15 minutes. (R., p. 2369; 
see Tr., p. 582, L. 11 - p. 583, L. 15 (a "practiced individual" might be able to 
remove the eyes in 10 or 15 minutes).) The coroner, however, testified that the 
procedure takes half an hour "if there are no complications." (Tr., p. 642, Ls. 17-
23.) Either time-frame is too long for both the x-rays and the removal of the eyes 
to have been accomplished in less than 20 minutes. 
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But I don't have a specific memory." (Exhibits, p. 4242 (08/24/04 Tr., p. 56, Ls. 
1-8).} 
Casey was embalmed by an employee of a private funeral home. (Tr., p. 
577, L. 13 - p. 579, L. 15.) The only time Casey's body left the funeral home 
after its arrival and before the funeral was for a long bone x-ray. (Tr., p. 601 Ls. 
10-13; p. 602, L. 12 - p. 604, L. 7.) The body was out of the custody of the 
funeral home or its employees for only 15 to 20 minutes while the x-ray was 
conducted. (Tr., p. 604, Ls. 16-25; p. 617, Ls. 5-25 (mortician stepped out of 
room for protection against radiation while x-rays being conducted).} The rest of 
the time his body would have been in a secured preparation room at the funeral 
home. (Tr., p. 614, L. 14 - p. 615, L. 13; p. 620, Ls. 5-22.) The only reason eyes 
would be removed at the funeral home would be for donation purposes. (Tr., p. 
625, Ls. 18-24.) 
Although, as noted by the district court, the evidence is conflicting, the 
district court's factual findings are ultimately supported by substantial competent 
evidence. Because the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing, they are not clearly erroneous and therefore 
"will not be disturbed on appeaL" Woodward v. State, 142 Idaho 98, 103, 123 
P.3d 1254, 1258 (Ct. App. 2005); see also Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,617, 
262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011). 
Stevens argues that the district court clearly erred because the evidence 
from the morticians proves the embalming preceded the taking of Casey's eyes. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 48-49.) The district court, while acknowledging that this 
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was the "most compelling" evidence put forward by Stevens, ultimately found that 
it was outweighed by contrary evidence indicating that the eyes had been taken 
at the time of the autopsy. (R, pp. 2368-69.) The appellate court will not 
reweigh conflicting evidence. Hopkins v. Pneumotech, Inc., 152 Idaho 611, 616, 
272 P.3d 1242, 1247 (2012) (where evidence is conflicting, appellate court will 
not reweigh evidence but will affirm the factual findings "regardless of whether we 
may have reached a different conclusion"); Schneider v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 
415,424, 258 P.3d 350, 359 (2011) (appellate court "will not reweigh conflicting 
evidence or attempt to judge the credibility of witnesses"); State v. Bettweiser, 
143 Idaho 582, 588, 149 P.3d 857, 863 (Ct. App. 2006) (appellate court 
"precluded from substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight of testimony and the reasonable inferences to 
be drawn from the evidence"). Although the evidence of the morticians is 
"compelling" evidence that the eyes had in fact been taken after the embalming 
absent conflicting eVidence,4 there was conflicting evidence and the trial court 
ultimately found that evidence more persuasive. (R, pp. 2368-69.) This Court 
cannot accept Stevens' argument without violating the fundamental tenet that it 
will not engage in reweighing of evidence. 
4 Stevens' argument also has the flaw that he failed to establish that anyone on 
the prosecution team was aware of when the embalming took place. Even had 
he established that the eyes were taken post-embalming he presented no 
evidence (and only the basest form of speculation) that any member of the 
prosecution team was aware of when the embalming took place in relation to 
other events. Thus, even had he succeeded in proving that the eyes were taken 
post-embalming, he failed to show that the prosecution team possessed or 
withheld any evidence of that fact. 
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Stevens next claims that "[c]ircumstantial evidence" shows the prosecutor 
and investigators "knew of the post-embalming removal." (Appellant's brief, pp. 
49-53.) Stevens first asserts that the prosecutor knew the eyes had been taken 
post-embalming and was deliberately withholding that evidence. The entirety of 
the claimed evidence for this accusation of willful misconduct is that at the 
preliminary hearing the prosecutor asked Dr. Slaughter "after you completed the 
autopsy, did you - were there documented retinal hemorrhages in Casey," did 
not directly ask Dr. Slaughter exactly when he removed the eyes in the second 
trial, and asked the County Coroner about the chain of custody of the eyes "prior 
to the start of the second trial." (Appellant's brief, pp. 49-51.) This is not 
evidence that the prosecutor knew and withheld evidence, but is instead the 
basest form of speculation. To make such a serious accusation without any 
actual evidence whatsoever is, at best, reckless. There is no justification for 
even having made such an accusation, much less justification for a finding of 
error. 
Stevens also argues that "many members of the prosecution team knew 
that Casey's eyes had been removed post-embalming." (Appellant's brief, p. 52.) 
He fails, however, to cite any evidence of this claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 52-
53.) In his recitation of the evidence Stevens admits there is no "direct evidence" 
supporting his theory that the eyes were taken at the funeral home after the 
embalming. (Appellant's brief, p. 41.) Rather, his theory rests on speculative 
conclusions such as: 
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1. Evidence that the coroner told a detective, on the day after both the 
autopsy and the embalming had been conducted, that the eyes had been 
"taken" means that the eyes had been collected the same day as the 
statement was made. (Appellant's brief, p. 41.5) 
2. That because taking eyes was not part of the normal autopsy procedure 
the eyes were not taken during the autopsy. (Appellant's brief, p. 43.) 
3. Because Dr. Slaughter testified that it "seem[ed] to [him] that someone 
else was in the room with [him]" when he removed the eyes and there 
were multiple people present at the autopsy, the removal of the eyes had 
to have been at the funeral home with the coroner. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
43-44.) 
4. The rest of Stevens' speculation is based on a lack of evidence, 
specifically lack of memory six to 15 years after the events. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 41-46.) 
This speculation is insufficient to show clear error in the district court's factual 
finding that the eyes were removed after embalming. Even more important, 
however, even accepting such speculation as reasonable it does not show what 
5 Besides the obvious speculation that the coroner was speaking of events of that 
day as opposed to the prior day, the evidence also indicated that the coroner 
may not have been talking about when the eyes had been "taken" from Casey's 
body at all. Dr. Slaughter was a private pathologist and so any tissue samples 
collected during the autopsy would have been stored at the hospital. (Tr., p. 644, 
L. 13 - p. 647, L. 2.) Thus, any examination or testing of samples would have to 
have been coordinated by the coroner's office with the hospital. (Tr., p. 650, Ls. 
9-19.) The full context of the note in the police report upon which Stevens relies 
includes that the eyes were photographed. (Exhibits, p. 4253.) The note is at 
least equally explainable as not relating to the original collection of the eyes as 
evidence but instead to coordinating the photographing of the eyes. 
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evidence was possessed by whom. There is no evidence in the record 
establishing that any member of the prosecution team possessed knowledge that 
Casey's eyes had been collected after his body had been embalmed. 
The district court found that Stevens failed to prove that Casey's eyes 
were collected after his body was embalmed. Thus, the prosecution team did not 
have evidence that the eyes had been taken after embalming. Stevens' 
argument on appeal is essentially that this Court should reweigh that evidence 
and reach different factual determinations. Because this Court will not reweigh 
evidence on appeal, Stevens' argument fails. 
D. Stevens Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination 
That Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Find The Mortuary 
Report Prior To Trial 
The district court concluded that the question presented by Stevens' claim 
that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to discover the mortuary report 
was limited to deficient performance. (R., p. 2370.) The court rejected the 
argument that the court had already found deficient performance by finding, in 
relation to the motion for a new trial, that the embalming report was available by 
the exercise of due diligence. (R., pp. 2370-71.) The court then concluded that 
there was no reason why competent counsel would have sought out the report 
because there was no basis prior to trial to believe that such a report would 
contain evidence useful to the defense. (R., p. 2371.) 
On appeal Stevens acknowledges that "[t]here is no doubt that trial 
counsel can be diligent even when he does not find a document if there was no 
reason to go looking for the document." (Appellant's brief, p. 64.) Despite 
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conceding the district court's rationale for finding no deficient performance, 
Stevens argues the district court erred because it "found that it could ignore" the 
prior holdings in the criminal case and that the district court's "attempted 
distinction" between the legal standard for availability of evidence by due 
diligence and the legal standard of deficient performance was "fallacious" 
because "the finding that trial counsel could have found the document through 
the exercise of 'due diligence' requires subsidiary findings of both a duty to 
search for the evidence and the ability to fulfill the duty." (Appellant's brief, p. 
64.) This argument lacks legal merit. 
Res judicata includes both claim and issue preclusion. Berkshire 
Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, _, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012). Here 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a different claim than the 
previously asserted claim of newly discovered evidence. Thus, the issue raised 
by Stevens is one of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel. See id. To 
demonstrate issue preclusion from a prior proceeding the party asserting it must 
show: (1) the party against whom it is asserted had a "full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue"; (2) the issue was identical; (3) the issue was actually decided; 
(4) there was a final judgment on the merits; and (5) the party to be estopped 
was the same or in privity with the party to the prior action. JJt; Kootenai Elec. 
Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 120,219 P.3d 440, 444 (2009). It is 
the second and third of these elements that Stevens has failed to show. 
On its face the issues related to a motion for new trial and a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are not identical. In post-conviction, Stevens 
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had the obligation of showing that counsel's pre-trial investigation was 
insufficiently thorough under the facts of the case. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 
407, 775 P.2d 1243, 1249 (Ct. App. 1989). The deficiency in the investigation 
must be an objective one, not merely a belief that a better or more thorough 
investigation would have resulted in favorable evidence. State v. Creech, 132 
Idaho 1, 19, 966 P .2d 1, 19 (1998). Whether counsel failed to conduct an 
adequate investigation due to an objective deficiency was not litigated in the new 
trial motion in the criminal case. Rather, Stevens failed to show that the 
embalming report was newly discovered evidence. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 
139, 146, 191 P.3d 217, 224 (2008). The Idaho Supreme Court specifically 
stated that to be newly discovered "the evidence itself, not just importance or 
materiality of that evidence, must be unknown and unavailable prior to trial." !sL 
"At most, Stevens has demonstrated that he did not recognize the importance or 
materiality of the Mortuary Embalming Report. As such, he has not presented 
any newly discovered evidence within the meaning of I.C. § 19-2604(7}." !sL 
Nowhere in the Stevens opinion did the Court so much as hint that it was 
concluding that Stevens had proved objectively deficient performance by trial 
counsel. 
In claiming that his counsel provided objectively deficient performance in 
investigating his case, Stevens first cites Justice Eismann's finding that Stevens 
had failed to prove he used due diligence. (Appellant's brief, p. 63 (citing 
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Exhibits, p. 38966 (,'There is no showing that the embalming report could not 
have been obtained prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence."».) That 
Stevens failed to prove that the report could not have been obtained by 
exercising due diligence is not the same as proving that it was not obtained 
because of an objective deficiency of counsel's performance. Justice Eismann 
did not find deficient performance by counsel, he merely found that Stevens had 
not carried his burden of proof on the element of unavailability of the evidence 
under the test for granting a new trial for newly discovered evidence. 
Stevens next relies on the Idaho Supreme Court's language in claiming 
collateral estoppel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 63-64.) Quoted in full (citations 
omitted, emphasis added), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
In order to be newly discovered evidence, the evidence 
itself, not just importance or materiality of that evidence, must be 
unknown and unavailable prior to trial. The fact that the defense 
did not inquire about the report until well after the trial does not 
make this report newly discovered. Likewise, that Stevens failed to 
present his own experts' opinions at trial does not make the 
evidence on which they rely newly discovered. At most, Stevens 
has demonstrated that he did not recognize the importance or 
materiality of the Mortuary Embalming Report. As such, he has not 
presented any newly discovered evidence within the meaning of 
I.C. § 19-2406(7) and is not entitled to a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191 P.3d at 224. This is a clear statement that 
Stevens failed to prove that the evidence was unavailable prior to trial. Nothing 
6 The state is using a different citation method to the exhibits than Stevens. 
Stevens cites to the exhibit number and then the page number of the exhibit. 
The state is citing the overall page number from the electronic copy of the 
exhibits. 
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in this language suggests the Court found that the reason this available evidence 
was not procured and used was because of an objective shortcoming of counsel. 
Stevens also argues that rejection of Justice Trout's dissent made a 
finding of lack of due diligence "necessary to the court's ruling." (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 64-65.) This argument fails on two levels. First, and most importantly, 
Stevens' failure to prove the unavailability of the evidence through the exercise of 
due diligence was not the same as affirmatively proving objectively deficient 
performance.? Stevens has pointed to nothing in the record that even suggests 
that whether counsel's investigation of Stevens' case was based on an objective 
deficiency was an issue in his new trial motion, much less that it was litigated to a 
factual finding. The only issue litigated in the new trial motion was the availability 
of the mortuary report, not why counsel did not discover and use it at trial. 
Second, Stevens does not explain why rejection of the dissent meant 
certain facts were implicitly found by the majority. On the contrary, the plain 
reading of the majority opinion is that it rejected the dissent's interpretation of the 
law. Indeed, the majority held that Stevens' new trial claim failed on the first 
prong of the test, Stevens, 146 Idaho at 146, 191 P.3d at 224, while the language 
in the dissent relied upon by Stevens addresses the fourth prong of the new trial 
7 Justice Horton's concurrence specifically mentions that Stevens' evidence did 
not address "two obvious questions:" (1) why the defense did not inquire about 
when the eyes were removed until after the second trial and (2) why the defense 
did not procure expert testimony about the tissue slides and photographs of the 
eyes prior to the second trial. "There was simply no evidence presented that 
addressed these subjects." Stevens, 146 Idaho at 153, 191 P.3d at 231 (Horton, 
J., concurring). These are exactly the questions raised by Stevens' post-
conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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test, id. at 154, 191 P.3d at 232 (cited in Appellant's brief, p. 64)). Indeed, 
Justice Trout's problem with the majority's analysis was that, in her opinion, it 
"completely eliminates the analysis of reasonable diligence or due diligence." ~ 
at 153, 191 P.3d at 231. The majority did not implicitly find that counsel's 
investigation of the case was objectively deficient merely because it disagreed 
with the dissent on the proper legal analysis. 
Finally, Stevens argues that the state should be judicially estopped from 
"taking a position directly opposite the position it argued on direct appeal." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 65.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, Stevens 
cites no evidence that the state argued on direct appeal that failure to discover 
the mortuary embalming report was the result of an objective shortcoming by trial 
counsel. Stevens did not present the state's appellate briefing or any transcript 
of oral argument on appeal as evidence in this case. His implicit claim that he 
proved what the state argued on appeal is specious in light of the complete lack 
of evidence to support it. 
Second, as shown above, the element of availability of newly discovered 
evidence for purposes of a new trial motion is not identical to the element of 
deficient performance in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Taking the 
position that the evidence was readily available to the defense is in no way 
inconsistent with denying that trial counsel failed to find it because of some 
objective deficiency in their performance. Indeed, discovery of all potentially 
exculpatory evidence is not a prerequisite to a constitutionally adequate pre-trial 
investigation. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) ("in considering 
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claims of ineffective assistance of counsel" for failure to conduct adequate 
-
pretrial investigation, Court does not address "what is prudent or appropriate, but 
only what is constitutionally compelled" (brackets, quotations and citations 
omitted»; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) ("a particular 
decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all 
the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's 
judgments"); Code v. Montgomery, 799 F.2d 1481, 1484 (11 th Cir. 1986) 
("[f]ailure to conduct a pretrial investigation ... is not a per se sixth amendment 
violation"). Any argument by the state in the appeal of the criminal case that 
Stevens had failed to prove the availability element of his new trial claim did not 
estop the state from arguing in the post-conviction case that Stevens failed to 
prove the deficient performance element of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
As pointed out numerous times in the arguments above, the fact the 
mortuary report was readily available to the defense did not make counsel's 
failure to procure it for trial per se objectively deficient performance. To prove 
deficient performance Stevens had to prove objectively unreasonable conduct by 
counsel. Stevens presented no evidence of objectively unreasonable conduct by 
counsel in support of his motion for new trial, and even acknowledges that a 
diligent effort may have failed to uncover the report because "there was no 
reason to go looking for the document." (Appellant's brief, p. 64.) The issue of 
why counsel did not procure the report and whether that was objectively 
unreasonable was not litigated in the new trial motion, but instead left for this 
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post-conviction action. Stevens has failed to show that collateral or judicial 
estoppel applied to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and has 
therefore failed to show error by the trial court. 
III. 
Stevens Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's Finding That 
Trial Counsel Conducted A Constitutionally Adequate Investigation Into Any 
Potential Defense Based On The Victim Having Taken The Acid Reflex 
Medication Propulsid 
A. Introduction 
In the criminal proceedings the district court concluded that evidence 
linking the anti-reflux medication Propulsid, which Casey was taking at the time 
of his death, with "cardiac arrest, edema, and other symptoms" was newly 
discovered but "was not material evidence likely to produce an acquittal." State 
v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144-45, 191 P.3d 217, 222-23 (2008). Specifically, 
the trial court found, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, that evidence of 
Propulsid's side effects was neither material nor likely to produce acquittal 
because the only evidence was that Casey died of a head injury caused by 
trauma, and head trauma was not a side effect of Propulsid. kL. at 145, 191 P.3d 
at 223. 
In addressing Stevens' claim that his counsel was ineffective for not 
introducing evidence of Propulsid's deleterious side effects at trial, the post-
conviction court first concluded that counsel could not have been ineffective for 
failing to produce evidence generated after the trial in question and granted 
partial summary dismissal on this point. (R., p. 1771-72.) The trial court then 
concluded that "trial counsel's performance did not fall below an objective 
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standard of reasonableness" for failing to find evidence linking Propulsid to heart 
attacks or for tactically choosing to present the theory that Casey died from a fall 
down the stairs, but gave Stevens 20 days to respond to this conclusion. (R., pp. 
1772-73.) 
After Stevens' response the court concluded there was no material dispute 
of fact and granted summary dismissal on the claim counsel should have 
presented Propulsid as a reason why Casey might have fallen down stairs. (R., 
pp. 1822-23.) The court then, in relation to whether the theory that Propulsid 
caused a heart attack that was the actual cause of death (rather than the head 
injury), found the following questions unanswered by the materials submitted by 
the parties in relation to summary dismissal: (1) the "level of knowledge that the 
medical community had about the risks of Propulsid at the time of trial" and (2) 
what Stevens' counsel "actually [knew] about Propulsid at the time of triaL" (R., 
p. 1823.) 
After the evidentiary hearing the district court answered those questions 
as follows: As to the first, it concluded that the evidence linking Propulsid to 
heart issues potentially available before the January 1999 trial included a 1996 
article in the New England Journal of Medicine linking the drug in Propulsid to 
arrhythmia; a 1998 "Dear Doctor Letter" stating that torsades de pointes (a 
particular type of arrhythmia) and cardiac "have been reported in patients taking 
Propulsid" and that its safety for pediatric patients had "not been established"; 
and an FDA "talk paper" reporting that "between 1993 and 1998 there were 38 
deaths in the U.S. of people taking Propulsid." (R., p. 2372.) As to the second 
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question, the district court found that Stevens' trial attorneys had contacted a 
knowledgeable attorney and two doctors and made a reasonable tactical 
decision to not further pursue Propulsid as a potential defense. (R., pp. 2374-
75.) The court thus concluded there was no deficient performance and, because 
the evidence found in the reasonable investigation was not significant, there was 
no prejudice. (R., pp. 2374-75.) 
On appeal Stevens claims that the district court erred, asserting that there 
was evidence of Propulsid's side effects that was not discovered by trial counsel, 
and that had counsel investigated further they would have found evidence 
sufficient to call Stevens' guilt into question. (Appellant's brief, pp. 69-82.) 
Specifically, Stevens argues that a conversation with Annabelle Hall, the lawyer 
with whom Stevens' counsel consulted, "alerted counsel to the possibility that 
Propulsid played a role in Casey's death." (Appellant's brief, p. 75.) That notice 
should have led counsel to "pick[] up the 1998 [Physician's Desk Reference]," 
which Stevens postulates was "likely sitting in their law firm's break room," or 
look at the warning on a box of Propulsid itself, which would, in turn, have led to 
the "dear Doctor letters, the New England Journal of Medicine, the Lancet, and 
the expert testimony" presented in the new trial and post-conviction proceedings. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 75-76.) Discovery of this information, in turn, would have 
led to the presentation of the experts presented at the new trial and post-
conviction proceedings, the lack of which prejudiced Stevens' trial. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 76-81.) Stevens has failed to show clear error in the district court's 
factual findings that consultation with an attorney and then two physicians about 
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potentially using Propulsid as a defense constituted adequate investigation by 
counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based. 
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92 
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); LC.R. 57(c). When the district court 
conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly 
erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court 
from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-
730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters 
solely within the province· of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 
97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's decision that a post-
conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. 
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
C. Stevens Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's 
Conclusion He Failed To Prove That His Trial Counsel's Performance 
Was Deficient 
An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
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professional assistance. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 
1271 (2010); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); 
Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). A 
reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the alleged error, 
not in hindsight, and presumes that "trial counsel was competent and that trial 
tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,791-
92,948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
680-81 (1984». Trial counsel's strategic and tactical decisions will not be 
second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a 
claim of ineffective counsel unless the petitioner has shown that the decision 
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 
877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428,430-31,788 
P .2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). "Rare are the situations in which the wide 
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to anyone 
technique or approach." Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 770, 789 
(2011) (internal quotes omitted). 
The district court concluded Stevens had failed to prove deficient 
performance in trial counsels' investigation into whether a defense could be 
based on the fact Casey was taking Propulsid. Specifically, the court concluded 
that by consulting with another attorney and two medical doctors about the issue, 
and finding no viable defense, the investigation by the attorneys was reasonable. 
(R., pp. 2370-75.) Stevens argues that his trial counsel were alerted to "the 
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possibility that Propulsid played a role in Casey's death" by the attorney they 
consulted. (Appellant's brief, p. 75.) This argument ignores the fact that the 
consultation with the attorney is what initiated the consultation with the two 
doctors. 
Stevens' attorney John DeFranco spoke with attorney Annabelle Hall on 
October 21,1998 and then again on November 21,1998. (Tr., p. 804, L. 9 - p. 
805, L. 2; p. 887, L. 25 - p. 892, L. 10; Exhibits, pp. 186-88 (letter and notes from 
contact with Annabelle Hall), 865-66 (DeFranco Deposition Tr., p. 51, L. 5 - p. 
56, L. 2).) The conversation Stevens primarily relies on was the one in October. 
(See Appellant's brief, p. 75 (citing State's Exhibit 109 (notes of 10/21/98 
conversation with Hall).) In that conversation Hall advised looking into whether 
"drug interactions" could have caused liver damage, "erythmia [sic]" or "D.I.C." 
(Exhibits, p. 187.) Thereafter trial counsel spoke with two doctors about drug 
interactions between Propulsid and the antibiotic Casey was also taking.8 (Tr., p. 
806, L. 15 - p. 808, L. 10; p. 892, L. 11 - p. 896, L. 15; Exhibits, pp. 189-93, 867-
68 (DeFranco Deposition Tr., p. 58, L. 22 - p. 59, L. 19; p. 60, L. 16 - p. 61, L. 
19).) This investigation led to concerns "that a child would be taking these 
medications, especially together," but nothing that would link the medications to 
the death for purposes of a defense. (Tr., p. 806, Ls. 4-10; see also Exhibits, p. 
866 (DeFranco Deposition Tr., p. 55, Ls. 14-21).) 
8 Counsel also mentions the Propulsid issue in three other, undated notes made 
during trial preparation. (Exhibits, pp. 387,414,423.) 
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Contrary to Stevens' argument, his trial attorneys did investigate the 
possibility of whether the fact Casey was taking Propulsid would be helpful to the 
defense after being alerted to this possibility by Ms. Hall. After consulting with 
two doctors they determined that it was not a profitable defense. The evidence 
clearly supports the district court's factual finding that the investigation was 
adequate. Stevens has failed to show the district court's factual findings are 
clearly erroneous. 
The question presented in this case is whether the "known evidence would 
lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 
139, 146, 139 P.3d 741,748 (Ct. App. 2006). Trial counsel need not pursue all 
potential assistance from experts. Harrington, _ U.S. at _, 131 S.Ct. at 787-
90 (counsel not ineffective for failing to procure forensic blood experts for trial). 
Even assuming that Stevens was correct and counsel had a duty, after learning 
that Casey was taking Propulsid and other medications, to investigate further, the 
evidence supported the district court's finding that in fact trial counsel did 
investigate further and discussed the matter with two potential experts. That 
consultation led to the conclusion that further investigation was likely to be 
fruitless. Stevens has failed to provide any authority even suggesting that 
counsel must persist in contacting as many experts as it takes until one will 
support a theory favorable to the defense. Stevens has therefore failed to 
demonstrate error in the district court's conclusion that consulting with another 
attorney and two potential experts constituted deficient performance by counsel. 
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IV. 
Stevens Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of Claims That 
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Presenting Additional Expert Testimony 
On His Theories Of The Case 
A. Introduction 
Stevens alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the 
testimony of Dr. Barnes as contained in his June 11, 2001 affidavit. (R., p. 12 
<1l1l41-44).) In that Affidavit Dr. Barnes stated he reviewed the CT scans of 
Casey conducted about an hour after the police were called and the CT scans 
and x-rays taken the next morning. (R., pp. 27-28.) Dr. Barnes offered five 
opinions based on his review of the scans and x-rays: First, that Casey suffered 
a "high force impact trauma to the brain." Second, the "suture separation" shown 
on the first CT scan "could not occur in a two (2) to three (3) hour period and 
would take approximately six (6) to twelve (12) hours to occur." Third, "the 
occipital skull fracture could be twenty-four (24) to forty-eight (48) hours old or 
older." Fourth, the brain injuries "could be three (3) hours to seven (7) days old." 
Fifth, that the "upper scalp swelling could range from three (3) hours to twenty-
four (24) hours." (R., p. 29.) Thus, although the suture separation, scalp injury 
and brain injury are within the time-frame of when the state alleged Stevens 
battered the child, the skull fracture would have happened one to two days prior. 
In support of this claim Stevens presented two additional affidavits of Dr. 
Barnes. In the first, dated November 22, 2010, Dr. Barnes adds that the size of 
the skull fracture in the first CT scan is "three to four centimeters." (Exhibits, pp. 
3938-39.) In the second, dated April 18, 2011, Dr. Barnes adds an opinion that 
the difference in the 2-3 cm size of the fracture as shown in the December 27 CT 
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scan and the 8 cm size at the "1/29/1997" autopsy was "the result of intracranial 
pressure which caused the length of the skull fracture to increase to 8 cm." 
(Exhibits, p. 4000.9) Stevens also presented the affidavit of Dr. Wecht, who 
"concur[red] with the opinions of Dr. Barnes" and testified that the 2-3 cm fracture 
in the first CT scan "strengthens and buttresses my opinion that this fracture 
could quite easily have been caused by an accidental fall." (Exhibits, p. 4077.) 
The district court concluded that because trial counsel procured the trial 
testimony of three experts-a physicist, a bio-engineer, and a forensic 
pathologist-who all testified that the skull fracture could be the result of an 
accidental fall, trial counsel was not deficient in failing to also consult or procure a 
radiologist to support the defense theory that Casey died from an accidental 
fal1. 1o (R., pp. 2376-77.) The district court further found neither deficient 
performance nor prejudice in the alleged failure to present Dr. Barnes' testimony 
about the timing of the fracture, because that timing was ultimately inconsistent 
with Stevens' theory of the case. (R., pp. 2377-79.) 
On appeal Stevens argues the district court erred because "it was obvious 
.,. that the size of the skull fracture was an important piece of evidence for the 
state." (Appellant's brief, p. 86.) In addition, he claims that any evidence that the 
9 Stevens apparently concedes that Dr. Barnes was mistaken about the date of 
the autopsy and that it occurred on December 29, 1996 instead of January 29, 
1997. (Appellant's brief, p. 84.) That Dr. Barnes got both the month and year 
wrong indicates he was mistaken and that the wrong date is not a mere typo. 
10 The district court did not make a specific finding on the prejudice prong of 
Stevens' claim that he trial counsel should have called an expert on the size of 
the skull fracture in the initial CT scans. (R., pp. 2375-79.) However, the district 
court ultimately found that prejudice from not calling Dr. Barnes was 
"speculative." (R., p. 2379.) 
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injury did not happen at the time the state alleged should have been sought out 
and presented. (Id.) These arguments fail because there is no constitutional 
duty to present expert testimony on every piece of evidence supporting the 
state's case. Stevens has failed to show error in the district court's determination 
that the defense acted reasonably in procuring the three experts it presented at 
trial to challenge the state's theory that the injuries to Casey were intentionally 
inflicted. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based. 
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92 
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); LC.R. 57(c). When the district court 
conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly 
erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court 
from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-
730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters 
solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 
97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's decision that a post-
conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. 
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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C. Stevens Has Failed To Show That Securing The Testimony Of A 
Radiologist Willing To Say That The Initial CT Scans Showed A 2-3 Cm 
Fracture Was Constitutionally Required 
A defense attorney is not required to present expert testimony on every 
piece of evidence important to the state. "The decision of what witnesses to call 
is an area where we will not second guess counsel without evidence of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 563, 199 P.3d 
123, 138 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Absent evidence of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance, or other shortcoming, "the presumption that counsel's 
performance fell within the acceptable range of professional assistance" requires 
the conclusion that not presenting expert testimony was not "below an objective 
standard of reasonableness." lQ.. Thus, even where certain evidence is 
potentially important at trial, trial counsel is not necessarily required to secure 
expert testimony regarding that evidence. Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 
131 S.Ct. 770, 787-90 (2011) (not obtaining forensic blood experts not deficient 
performance); Payne, 146 Idaho at 563, 199 P.3d at 138 (not presenting expert 
to challenge reliability of eyewitness identification not deficient performance); 
State v. Youngblood, 117 Idaho 160, 165,786 P.2d 551, 556 (1989) ("We cannot 
assume that merely because no expert witness was called that trial counsel was 
ineffective."); Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139,146,139 P.3d 741, 748 (Ct. App. 
2006) ("a defendant's lawyer does not always have a duty to consult experts 
when the government is proposing to put on expert witnesses"). 
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This case is analogous to State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 948 P.2d 127 
(1997), where Porter presented in post-conviction the testimony of a pathologist 
who challenged the state's trial evidence that Porter was unusual in pulling hair 
during an assault and testified there were several errors in the autopsy, which 
errors may have changed the autopsy's conclusion that the victim was tortured to 
death. !Q. at 793, 948 P.2d at 148. Although the Idaho Supreme Court was 
"somewhat troubled" that counsel made no effort to employ a pathologist such as 
presented in post-conviction proceedings, counsel's conduct was not "so 
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness." !Q. at 793-94, 
948 P.2d at 148-49. Counsel's performance in this instant case is less "troubling" 
than counsel's conduct in Porter, if troubling at all. As opposed to Porter, where 
defense counsel called no experts to rebut the state's scientific evidence, 
Stevens' counsel called multiple experts. That Stevens now believes that four 
experts should have been called to challenge the state's theory that the injuries 
were deliberately inflicted, instead of the three that the defense in fact called, 
does not show that counsels' performance was objectively deficient. 
Stevens utterly failed to prove that trial counsels' decision to present three 
experts, not including a radiologist, to support the defense theory that the injuries 
were caused by an accident instead of inflicted by Stevens was the result of any 
objective deficiency. He has failed to show any error in the district court's 
conclusion he failed to prove this claim. 
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D. Stevens Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Conclusion He Failed 
To Prove Prejudice 
To prove the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel the 
petitioner must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). This requires 
the petitioner to prove more than "that the errors had some conceivable effect on 
the outcome of the proceeding." kL. at 693. "Counsel's errors must be 'so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.'" 
Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, _, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787-88 (2011) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687».11 
At best Stevens has demonstrated that Dr. Barnes' testimony would have 
been helpful at trial, not that it was required to grant him a "fair trial ... whose 
result is reliable." The trial court correctly determined that whether Casey's 
injuries were the result of accident or abuse was fully and fairly litigated. That 
Stevens now, years later, believes it could have been better litigated is not 
sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Harrington, _ U.S. at 
_, 131 S.Ct. at 789 ("Reliance on the harsh light of hindsight to cast doubt on a 
trial that took place ... years ago is precisely what Strickland ... seek[s] to 
prevent." (internal quotes omitted)). 
11 "[T]he difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-probable-
than-not standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case." Harrington,_ 
U.S. at , 131 S.Ct. at 791-92. 
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V. 
Stevens Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
A. Introduction 
The district court rejected Stevens' argument that cumulative error showed 
he had been denied a fair trial. (R., p. 2382.) On appeal Stevens asserts 
cumulative error without further elucidation. (Appellant's brief, p. 96.) He has 
failed to show cumulative error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act are civil in 
nature, where there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision 
made after an evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that 
decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 
P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. Stevens Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Rejection Of His 
Cumulative Error Claim 
Some courts have applied the cumulative error doctrine to the prejudice 
prong of Strickland. Wilson v. Simmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1122 (10th Cir. 2008). 
Under Idaho's doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453,872 P.2d 708,716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. 
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407, 958 P.2d 22,33 (Ct. App. 1998). Thus, if . 
a petitioner fails to prove more than one incident of deficient performance then 
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there is no prejudice to cumulate. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 
321 (Pa. 2011). The ultimate question of Strickland prejudice is whether the 
defendant was denied "a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). 
Stevens has failed to show his counsel committed two acts of deficient 
performance, and therefore has failed to show any errors to cumulate. Even if 
there had been multiple acts of deficient performance, Stevens has failed to 
show that they would be cumulatively prejudicial. For example, alleged deficient 
performance of appellate counsel could not have prejudiced the trial, and alleged 
deficient performance by trial counsel could not have prejudiced the appeal. 
Likewise, Stevens has failed to articulate how the mortuary report, which goes to 
whether Casey was shaken, evidence related to Propulsid, which would have 
been offered to show Casey died from an alternate cause, and Dr. Barnes' 
testimony, challenging the size and timing of the fracture, would tend to cumulate 
except in the most abstract way. Finally, in light of the overwhelming evidence 
that Stevens abused Casey for at least weeks, that Casey was injured when in 
Stevens' care, and that the horrendous injuries were entirely inconsistent with a 
fall down stairs, and the jury's rejection of Stevens' extensive evidence meant to 
cast doubt on his guilt presented in the trial, Stevens has failed to show that his 




The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Stevens' petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 6th day of December, 2012. 
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